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ESSAY
USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN DETERMINING THE
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Kenneth S. Gallant*

Much of the discussion of the universalization of individual human
rights turns on whether it is appropriate to impose specific values on all
societies around the world.' This often transforms the discussion into a
political discourse, which is not a necessarily a bad thing. Whether
rights ought to be universalized necessarily turns on political theory and
the concrete situation of humanity.
This trend does have negative effects, however. Generalized
discussion of the concept of human rights distracts from examination of
universalization of specific principles or rules of human rights law. It
also tends to cover up the difference between the description of practice
concerning each of these rights on the one hand, and the moral force of
the arguments for or against universalization on the other. 2
There is also an unfortunate tendency to make exaggerated claims
that certain non-treaty statements of human rights law, especially the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),3 have fully passed
into customary international law. This is true even on the U.N. website:
"The international community as a whole, moved by the universal
juridical conscience, conferred upon the Universal Declaration the
dimension that it has today, recognized in the international case law,
* The author is a Professor at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H.
Bowen School of Law, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA. A prior version of this piece was
informally presented at XVIII International Congress of Comparative Law, Session on Public
Freedom and Human Rights (IV.C.): Are Human Rights Universal and Binding? Limits of
Universalism, July 29, 2010, Washington DC. The paper was not part of any National Report, or
Reporter's Summary, which constituted the formal presentations at, and proceedings of, the
session. Material from the International Congress cited herein is on file with the author. This
Essay was completed with the assistance of a grant from the University of Arkansas at Little
Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law.
1. See generally, e.g., David Kennedy, The InternationalHuman Rights Movement: Part
of the Problem? 15 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 101 (2002); Thomas Franck, Are Human Rights
Universal?, FOREIGN AFF. (Jan.-Feb. 2001); Andrew Fagan Human Rights, Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 5, http://www.iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/#H5 (last updated July 5,
2005).
2. U.N.G.A. Res. 217 (III) (10 Dec. 1948) (approved 48-0, with 8 abstentions).
3.

E.g., JOHN P. HUMPHRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT

ADVENTURE 73-77 (1984). Humphries, as one of the major figures in the creation of the UDHR,
has more right than most to boast of this, and he does at least discuss opposing views.
429
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incorporated in the domain of customary international law, and gave
expression to some general principles of law universally recognized."A
It also appears in popular digital culture on the Internet:
Many international lawyers, in addition, believe that the
Declaration forms part of customary international law and is a
powerful tool in applying diplomatic and moral pressure to
governments that violate any of its articles. The 1968 United
Nations International Conference on Human Rights advised that
it "constitutes an obligation for the members of the international
community" to all persons.
To similar effect was a nearly contemporaneous statement of a group
of major non-governmental organizations. 6 This pattern is not always
limited to the use by members of the public of the UDHR as a source of
human rights. It exists, for example, in the practice of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). As Theodore
Meron has stated: "Its practice was . . . akin more to that applied in the
human rights field than in other areas of international law. In both
human rights and humanitarian law, emphasis on opinio juris helps to
compensate for scarcity of supporting practice."7 He goes on to indicate
dissatisfaction with this method, arguing that the ICTY might have
looked further "to identify actual state practice."
Careful scholarly efforts will often say that "some" or "many"
provisions of the UDHR have passed into customary international law. 9
However, even these works often do not specify which of the rights set
out in the UDHR have become customary international law, do not
identify the specific content of each of these rights, or do not provide
the documentation of state practice and opinio juris necessar to
demonstrate the customary international law nature of these rights.
4. Ant6nio Augusto Cangado Trindade, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Introduction, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ cod/avl/ha/udhr/udhr.html (U.N. Audio-Visual
Library of International Law, last visited Sept. 2, 2011) (quoting Proclamation of Teheran, U.N.
GAOR, 23d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 (1968)).
5. Wikipedia, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Universal declaration of human-rights (as visited Sept. 2, 2011) (subject to anonymous
change without notice).
6. Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights, March 22-27, 1968, reprinted
in 9 J. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 94 (1969).
7.

THEODORE MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 264 (1998).

8. Id. at 265.
9. See Hurst Hannum, The UDHR in National and InternationalLaw, 3 HEALTH &
HUM. RTS. 144, 148-49, 156 n.23 (1998) (collecting sources using both "some" and "many");
see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES, Part VII, Law of Human Rights, Introductory Note (1987).

10.

See id

§ 702, cmt. a (listing some human rights as having passed into customary
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These patterns create an important problem in the traditional rhetoric
of human rights and human rights law. Overstatement leads to a
devaluing of the customary international law of human rights.
Specifically, if broad statements are made concerning the customary
status of certain human rights, without sufficient actual practice to back
up the statements, the statements will be viewed with suspicion.I
Similar statements about other rights, for which there is practice, may
also be viewed with unjustified suspicion. Indeed, this can lead to the
view that international human rights law is not truly "law," at least
outside the context of human rights treaty law.
The less evidence of both practice and opiniojuris that is presented,
the "softer" the resulting law appears.12 Yet, human rights law, which
attempts to enforce internal standards on states, needs for this very
reason to be as "hard" as it can be made. A session on Universalization
of Human Rights at the recent XVIII International Congress of
Comparative Law points in this different direction, with a fuller
grounding in practice around the world. Participants discussed actual
national practice and official opinion (opinio juris) with regard to
international human rights, as defined through international, regional
and national mechanisms.
They also presented national views with regard to the universality of
these human rights (i.e., their universal normative force, if any).
Critically, though at a comparative law conference, they addressed the
perspective of international law in examining the universality of the
rights contained in the Covenants of 1966 and other international and
regional human rights instruments.13 Perhaps because of humans' need
to categorize, both the Questionnaire and the National Reports have
continued to treat all human rights together for purposes of
universalization. The most general distinction that we see among human
rights is the specific inclusion in the National Reports of Portugal,
Russia, and some other countries of "positive" human rights (generally
those included in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights) along with the "negative" rights included in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); others
focus only on ICCPR-type rights.14 However, as the National Reporter
international law, but then stating in the comment that this list is "not necessarily complete," and
not providing in the documentary material evidence for the passage of the listed rights into
customary international law); see generally Hannum, supra note 9.
11. MERON, supra note 7, at 263-65.
12. See id.
13. Rainer Arnold, General Reporter's Questionnaire, Are human rights universal and
binding? (Les droits des l'homme, sont-ils universels et normatives?). Professor Arnold is
preparing the formal reports for publication as a book by Springer Publishing. See cmt. 015.
14. See id. cmts. 016 & 019.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

3

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5
432

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24

for Singapore stated in the discussion, some rights in each category may
have been universalized, others may not have been.' The analysis must
proceed right-by-right if it is to provide an accurate description of
normative practice.
Accurate description of the universalization (or not) of human rights
requires the fusion of techniques of comparative law and public
international law. International human rights law as a scientific
discipline requires determining what rights have become universalized
as part of customary international law, or perhaps as general principles
of law, and what the specific content of the universalized versions of
those rights are. These are matters of public international law. If we
want to say that a right is universal, we must effectively show either that
it is universally adopted by treaty, that it has become customary
international law, or that it embodies a peneral principle of law present
in the major legal systems of the world.
Universal treaty law dealing with specific human rights is rare. (A
few near-universal treaties are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.1 7 ) Determining
universality or near-universality here is a matter of treaty interpretation.
Yet, even international human rights treaty analysis may require
comparative technique: treaties may "differ in character, in subjective
scope in range, and they function (and bind) differently as sources of
law.'
Determination of rights defined by customary international law and
general principles of law involves understanding what is the actual
practice (including the internal law) of states (and international
organizations operating within their areas of competencel 9 ). Showing
15. See id. cmt. 020.
16. Cf, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (generally viewed as
stating the sources of international law, although applying directly only to cases in the ICJ).
Note that, at least in terms of general principles of criminal law and procedure, the system of
international criminal courts and tribunals is becoming a new legal system, alongside civil law,
common law, Islamic law and other national systems. For a demonstration of the use of general
principles of law as a means of defining human rights, see Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B.
INT'L L. 82, 106 (1992), quoted and discussed in Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of
Customary InternationalHuman Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 1 (1995/96).
17. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

18. Id at 1 (discussing, e.g., the differences in universalism when a treaty covers persons,
for example, women or children or acts, for example, torture).
19. See Kenneth S. Gallant, International Criminal Courts and the Making of Public
InternationalLaw: New Roles for InternationalOrganizationsand Individuals, 43 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 603 (2010) (international organizations now provide instances of practice which are
used in constituting and identifying customary international law).
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that something has become customary international law also requires
learning the opinio juris of these entities with respect to their practice
(i.e that they believe their practice is consistent with or required by
law 0)

Human rights law (whether domestic or international) deals with the
relationship of governments with their own nationals as well the
nationals of other states. State practice with regard to international
human rights necessarily includes internal national practice, such as
domestic constitutional provisions and statutes affecting both nationals
and non-nationals. 2 1 This differs from the traditional view of public
international law practice as dealing only with interactions among
states.
To understand what is customary international human rights law or a
general principle of law in the area of human rights, one must actually
compare laws; one must consider what the law on a suggested human
right is in a broad variety of states that includes states from different
legal cultures of the world. These laws must be contrasted with each
other to find the common elements that comprise a general principle of
law, and to determine those elements on which no consensus exists.
This task is pre-eminently that of comparative law.2 2 The Polish
National Report points out that one may look at different rights
differently, that rights may have different content in different countries
and at different times, that rights may be enforced differently, and so
on. 23
This comparative law approach need not be limited to international
human rights law. As one example, the International Court of Justice
recently used national law as practice to determine customary
international law of criminal immunity of high foreign officials.2 4 In the
Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ "carefully examined state practice,
including legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts"
in determining that customary international law did not permit
prosecution of a sitting foreign minister in the courts of another state for
crimes against humanity, when the state of which he was foreign
minister claimed immunity for him.25 One distinguished commentator
after World War II went even further: "if a practice is generally
20.

See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 84, 84-89 (6th ed. 2008)

(collecting major sources).
21. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
InternationalLaw: A Reconciliation,95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 788 (2001).
22. See generally material prepared for Opening Plenary: The Role of Comparative Law
in Courts and International Tribunals, at this Congress.
23. Id. at 1-2.
24. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo
v. Belgium), Judgment, 58, [2002] I.C.J. 3, 24 (14 Feb. 2002).
25. Id.
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regarded by states in their conduct of internal affairs as representing a
principle of justice it is also enforceable as a rule of customary
international law."2 As another example, Professor Mireille DelmasMarty has recently shown the need to use comparative law in the
determination of the substance of international criminal law, and how it
has been done in the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 27
I would like to demonstrate the fusion of international and
comparative law using an example from human rights law that is rather
straightforward: the prohibition against retroactive creation of criminal
law to convict a person of an act which was non-criminal when done.2 8
This rule is often stated as the maxim nullum crimen sine lege ("nothing
is a crime without a [pre-existing] law against it") or as the prohibition
of ex post facto criminal law.29 It appears in the UDHR, the ICCPR,
regional human rights instruments, international humanitarian law and
other treaties, and the domestic law of the vast majority of states. 30 The
law implementing this prohibition, however, varies from nation to
nation, and even to some extent from treaty to treaty.3 1
A general prohibition against retroactive crime creation appeared in
one way or another in the law of nearly every countr7 . It appears in the
constitutions of over 80% of U.N. Member States.3 Of the remaining
states, several have the prohibition in their penal codes and a few in
their general human rights legislation or elsewhere in their statutory
law.3 3 Finally, almost all of the rest had adopted the ICCPR and one of
the general regional human rights treaties which require non26.

George Brand, The Sources of International Criminal Law, 15 U.N. WAR CRIMES

COMMIsSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 5, 6-7 (published for the U.N. War

Crimes Commission by H.M. Stationery Office, 1947-49) (authorship attributed in Forward by
Lord Wright of Durley, id. at x), relying on The Hostages Case, as excerpted at 8 U.N. WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 49-50 , and citing to The
Schoenfeld Case, 11 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra, at 72-73.

27.

Mireille Delmas-Marty, Comparative Criminal Law as a Necessary Tool for the

Application of International Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL

JUSTICE 97 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009).
28.

See KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND

COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW (2009) (detailing thoroughly the existing non-retroactivity
provisions and their patterns in different world legal systems). For purposes of simplicity in the
current Essay, issues concerning non-retroactivity of increased punishments are omitted, as are a
few exceptions in a few countries.

29.

See generally id. at 11-14.

30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 11; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 15; for other sources, see generally GALLANT, supra note 28.

31.

GALLANT, supra note 28.

32.

Id. at 244 n.48 (listing provisions).

33.

Id. at 246-48.
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retroactivity of crime creation. 34 The only three generally recognized
states which have no constitutional or statutory provisions, or general
treaty obligations to observe non-retroactivity of crime creation have
adopted treaties requiring that it be applied in specific situations
indicating that they cannot be hostile to the rule in general. So the
entire world, at some level, accepts this principle.
Without application of comparative law techniques, however, this
inquiry would be incomplete. There are important variations in the
statement and implementation of this right across states and within the
*
international criminal
justice system. 36
For example, many countries follow the example in Article 8 of the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, applying a
rule that no act can be criminal except pursuant to a previously enacted
statute.37 Indeed, for many, this is the appropriate principle of nonretroactivity, which ought to be enshrined in the law. Anything which
derogates from it does not fully implement the principle of requiring a
clear, previously announced statement of what is prohibited.
Comparative law, however, teaches us that we must look at actual
practice across legal cultures. When this is done, we see that many
countries' constitutions follow something like the text of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: "No one shall be held guilty of a penal
offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
penal offense, under national or international law, at the time when it
was committed." 39 This respects the common law tradition of nonstatutory criminal definitions because it does not require a statutory
statement of what constitutes a penal offense, yet still requires that the
act have been a crime at the time committed.
This has also become the legality rule for international criminal law
in international criminal courts and tribunals; so long as charged acts of
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes were crimes under
international law when committed, they may be prosecuted under the
later statutes of those tribunals. 40 Note here that the international legal
34. Id. at 248-49.
35. Id. at 250-51 (Brunei, Bhutan, and Vatican City are all parties to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, prohibiting retroactive crime creation as to children; the latter two are
parties to Additional Protocol 11 (1977) to the Geneva Conventions (1949)).
36. See GALLANT, supra note 28, at 251-61.
37. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, Aug. 26, 1789, art. 8 (Fr.).
38. See GALLANT, supra note 28, at 25-26, 33-36 (discussing why legislation may be
superior to making criminal rules through common law).
39. U.N.G.A. Res. 217 (III), supra note 2, art. 11(2).
40. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
135-45 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995); Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub
Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise, T 10 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
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system is itself becoming a subject of the study of comparative law. In
this case, the international criminal justice system is becoming another
legal system of the world, which needs to be set for comparison
alongside common law, civil law, Islamic law, and other types of
national law systems.
Comparative law also has a great deal to say about human rights
development over time. For example, Islamic comparativist Haidar Ala
Hamoudi and others have pointed out that ta 'azir crimes in traditional
Islamic law were sometimes created retroactively. 4 1 Without this work,
it would not be possible to see the importance of the inclusion of nonretroactivity of crime creation in the recently-effective Revised Arab
42
Charter of Human Rights, nor the importance of the fact that nearly all
Islamic majority countries have now put general non-retroactivity
-43
provisions into their laws.
Similarly, nations formerly or currently adopting the socialist legal
system have in the past twenty years or so moved, nearly en masse, to
accepting non-retroactivity of crimes. 44 For nations representing two
major legal systems (Islamic and socialist) to accept a new human rights
limitation in their national laws is very significant when considering the
universality of that limitation.
When worldwide practice is examined, one sees that all countries
generally accept a rule like that of the UDHR, that an innocent act may
not be criminalized retroactively. 45 However, some countries, and the
international criminal law system, do not fully accept the stronger
definition of non-retroactivity from the French Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of the Citizen.
Thus, the right to be free of punishment for retroactively-created
crimes has only been universalized to the extent of the version stated in
the UDHR. Without the inclusion of the comparative law perspective,
the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, 617 (Sept. 2, 1998) (applying relevant treaty law adopted into domestic law, and
discussing customary international law); Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL 04-14AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004);see
generally GALLANT, supra note 28 (discussing, e.g., U.N. Sec. Council, Report of the SecretaryGeneral Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704,
34 (May 3, 1993). But cf Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 11, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) (prohibiting exercise of jurisdiction over crimes occurring
before the creation of the ICC).
41. Haidar Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the Necessity
ofRealism in the Study ofIslamic Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 423 (2008).
42. League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 15 (Sept. 15, 1994).
43.

GALLANT, supra note 28, at 270-71.

44. Id.
45. Again, for purposes of simplicity, this Essay leaves out discussion of acts at the
"edges" of criminal definitions, which might foreseeably be held to be within the definition of
cnme.
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however, it would be difficult to see the strength of the trend of
universalization. The general human rights treaties are not quite
universally accepted and large regions-especially Asia and Oceaniado not have regional human rights treaties. Therefore, a "pure"
international treaty analysis would not reveal the extent of
universalization without the examination of domestic constitutional and
statutory law of the non-treaty states. Similarly, without the comparative
law perspective, one might not understand the significance of the
difference between the UDHR version of non-retroactivity and its
stronger French-origin version. Certainly, without bringing comparative
law into the picture, one could not determine which version has been
universalized as a matter of customary international law or as general
principles of law accepted by the legal systems of the world.
Non-retroactivity of crimes is a relatively straightforward instance of
the universalization of a human right. Understanding it requires a
straightforward
comparative
technique-examining
different
implementations of the right to discover its common core.
Not all uses of comparative technique to discover whether a human
right has been universalized and to what extent universalization has
happened will be so easy. One can imagine, for example, that the
implementations of freedom of expression show much greater variation
from country to country. Attitudes concerning exceptions and limitation
on the right vary greatly. It is also the case that far more states which
have ratified human rights conventions have political systems which
more or less regularly violate any sensible definition of this right. Thus,
in this case, it will be much more difficult to determine how much of the
principle of free expression has become a rule of customary
international law, or even what the general principles of law concerning
free expression may be.
Another important issue concerning the universalization and
particularization of human rights is being discussed at this Congress:
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. A
special plenary session addressed the question "to what extent the
cultural heritage of an individual may have bearing on analyzing
whether acts constitute torture . . . [and] to what extent space exists for
cultural relativism in this context[?]' 6 Here we can see that other
46. Plenary, The Prohibition of Torture and Cultural Relativism, 30 July 2010, Agenda
description, available at http://www.wcl. american.edulevents/2010congress/agenda.en.cfm
(last visited Sept. 4, 2011). The agenda description uses the definition of torture from Article I
of the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (ratified by 146 countries). However, it is generally agreed that torture is prohibited
by customary international law as well (though the content of the customary international law
definition is not universally agreed upon). Because this was a special session, no General Report
has been posted on the Congress's website. The author hopes the work of this session will be
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comparative techniques might be used. One might, for example, find the
universal principles embodied in the prohibition of torture, perhaps
using the techniques above. Then, one would examine specific cultural
contexts to determine whether a given practice would violate these
principles in a specific culture or set of cultures. 47 Here, comparative
law might be used both in determining the universal content of the
prohibition and in particularizing the acts prohibited in any given
culture and legal system.
In sum, it is not enough simply to say that the essence of a right is
universal, but that implementation of that right may vary among
countries. The comparative law perspective allows us to sort through the
various national implementations of a right to determine just what its
universalized content is-what has become customary international law.
This analysis may demonstrate that key moral principles behind a
given "human right" have not yet become universalized. Even worse, in
the case of some rights which we would like to consider "universal," the
analysis may show that no rule of customary international law has
emerged, or even that no general principle of law exists. This would
mean that, as a matter of actual international law, these human rights
depend on treaty adoption, interpretation and application, and on future
effort to change practice so that they become truly universal.

published in another form. Another session addressed Religion and the Secular State (Session
1.b). However, because there is not yet universal agreement on whether states should be secular,
it will not be further discussed in this very brief Essay. An interim version of the Reports for
that session is available at https://www.wcl.american.edu/events/2010congress/reports/
(last
GeneralReports/IBReligionand theSecularState - InterimReports.pdf?rd=1
visited Aug. 2010).
47. For example, one will sometimes see in the South Asian press discussion of whether
placing leather shoes on the heads of prisoners or those being investigated for crime constitutes
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In the context of most South Asian cultures,
this is a powerfully degrading act, which for many people would cause extreme mental and
emotional suffering. In many other cultures, this act does not have a similar degrading force.
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